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v.
STATE EX REL. DAILY MAIL PUBLISHING CO., et al.
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SUMMARY:

State/Civil

Timely

This case poses the question whether West Virginia

Code § 49-7-3, which forbids the publication in a newspaper of the name
of any child involved in juvenile court proceedings,

v creates

an imper-

W.Va. Cod~ § 49-7-3 provides in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall the
name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter,
be published in any newspaper without a written order of the court • • • .
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- 2 missible prior restraint on the freedom , of the press.
2.

FACTS:

Petrs are circuit court judges and the prosecuting

attorney of Kanawha county, West

Virginia~

resps are two newspapers and

several of their employees.
In February 1978 both newspapers printed stories naming a juvenile

charged in the fatal shooting of a student at a local junior high school .
Th~

county prosecuting attorney sought and obtained indictments against

resps for violating § 49-7-3.

Resps brought an original action in the

West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals seeking to prohibit petrs from
prosecuting them under the statute.

Resps argue that the statute consti-

tuted a prior restraint in violation of the West Virginia Constitution.
The West Virginia court, however, decided to tap the well-developed body
of federal case law in this area and tested the statute against First
Amendment standards of the Federal Constitution.

Noting that prior

restraints bear a "heavy presumption" against their constitutional validit::_
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415

(1971), the

court rejected the state's argument that a child's interest in anonymity
with regard to his youthful transgressions and

the~ate's

interest in

assuring him a future free of prejudice were sufficiently compelling to
uphold the statute.

The court found little distinction between this

case and Oklahoma Publishing co. v. District Court.

1s- L.tJ.

~19

(1977

which held unconstitutional a state court's injunction against publicati
in the news media of the name and photograph of an 11 year old boy charg
in a juvenile proceeding with delinquency by second degree murder.

The

- 3 Virginia court a1so found support in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 4~

LIAJ. 1-~ (1978},
cr~inal

subjected newspapers to

which invalidated a statute that
sanctions for divulging information

regarding proceedings before state judicial review commissions.
the court found Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420
instructive.

u.s.

Finally,

469 (1975),

In that case this Court held a Georgia tort action for

invasion of privacy grounded upon a newspaper's publication of the name
of a rape

viet~

unconstitutional in spite of the legitimate state

interest in protecting innocent

vict~s

from embarrassment.

From these

cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that § 49-7-3 constitutes a prior restraint on freedom of the press in violation of the
{_

First Amendment.
3.

Accordingly, writs of prohibition issued.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs first urge that this Court adopt a balancing

test employed by the District Court for the Virgin Islands in Virgin
Islands v. Brodhurst, 285 F.Supp. 831 (DC, Virgin Islands, 1968}, which
held that the advantages accomplished by a statute shielding the names
of juvenile offenders justified the

~etrs

l~itation

placed upon the press.

argue that" in balancing the interests between the freedom of the

press and the juvenile's interest in anonymity,

• clearly the j uvenil·

interest and the state's interest in protecting the youth outweigh the
'

public's right to know."

Petn at 13.

Petrs characterize Oklahoma

Publishing co. as holding merely that since the relevant Oklahoma statute
provided for closed juvenile detention hearings,

the press could not

be enjoined from publishing the name of the juvenile revealed during a

- 4 "public" proceeding.

Landmark Communications, Inc., according to petrs,

"was not decided on the issue of whether the statute created an impermissible prior restraint.N Finally, petrs argue that § 49-7-3 does
not impose an absolute prohibition on publication of the child's name,
but rather places the determination whether the name should be publ:i.she.:l
with the "proper person -- the judge.
For some reason, resps

Daily Gazette and Marsh (one of its

reporters) go to great length to show that the West Virginia statute is
not within the obscenity, libel, and defamation exceptions to the freedom of press guarantee of the West Virginia constitution.

Resps Gazette

and Marsh also argue that West Virginia cannot constitutionally authorize
state judges the discretion to grant or deny a newspaper permission to
publish a juvenile defendant's name.

"If a newspaper had to retain an

attorney to petition a court to schedule a hearing to obtain an order
approving publication of a juvenile's name every time a juvenile is
arrested and charge with the commission of a felony in a public place
certainly a matter which the public in a given locality has a right
and need to know-- the value of the public's timely receiving this
information would be lost -- assuming the judge saw fit tog rant the
order."

These resps finally argue that the state interests supporting

§ 49-7-3 do not justify the prior restraint on First Amendment freedoms • .

Resp Daily Mail Publishing Co. largely reasserts the reasoning of
the West Virginia Supreme
4.

~ court.

DISCUSSION: In Oklahoma Publishing Co. this Court .held "that

- 5 the First and Fourteenth Amendments will , not permit a state court to
prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at
court proceedings which were in fact open to the public."
at 3599.

45 U.S.L.W.

The court stressed the public nature of the proceedings:

"[M]embers of the press were in fact present at the hearing with the
full knowledge of the presiding · judge, the prosecutor, and the defense

counsel. ~

objection was made to the presence of the press in the

courtroom or to the photographing of the juvenile as he left the courthouse."

Id.

Thus, the thrust of Oklahoma Publishing co. would appear

to be that the state interest in prohibiting publication of already
public information is insufficient to justify the prior restraint on
the press.

Here, the newspapers acquired the juveniles name through

--

independent investigation, and there is no indication that the juveniles
-------------~

name

wa ~

was likely to become, publicly known.

In Landmark Communications, Inc., the Court invalidated a Virginia
statute making it a crime to divulge information regarding proceedings
before a state judicial review commission that is authorized to hear
complaints about judges• disability or misconduct.

Stressing that a

major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs, including discussion of the operations of courts
and of judicial conduct, the court concluded that "the publication
Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the
First Amendment, and the commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual

and potential encroachments on freedom .of speech and of the press which
follow therefrom." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4392.

Here, although the names of

persons accused of crime are of legitimate interest to the public, it
is not clear that publication of such names "lies near the core of the
First Amendment."

v

v'

This Court's decisions in the First Amendment area suggest, but
seem to
do not/compel, the conclusion reached by the West Virginia Supreme Court .
The state maintains that nondisclosure of the names of juvenile defendants is central to its juvenile justice system.

The interests advanced

by the state in support of the statute are hardly insubstantial, and
this case, which to me is a closer one than the cases cited by the West
Virginia Supreme Court, seems deserving of serious consideration.
There are two responses.
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Smith v. State

The Supreme Court of West Virginia invalidated a
state statute that proscribed the publishing of the name of
a juvenile in connection with any juvenile proceedings.

The

court relied in major part on Oklahoma Publishing Co. and
Nebraska Press, holding the statute to be an invalid prior
restraint.
The Attorney General of West Virginia, on behalf
of petitioners, has filed a weak and second-rate brief,
arguing that the state interest in protecting juveniles from
publicity and furthering their rehabilitation if found
guilty of crime, is sufficiently substantial to justify the
statute, and the imposition of a criminal penalty for its
violation.
This case arose when the Charleston Gazette, a
daily newspaper published in Charleston and owned by
respondent Daily Mail Publishing Co., deliberately violated
the statute for the purpose of setting up a test case.

It

ran a story about a 14-year-old student charged with murder,
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giving his name, and in the same issue ran an editorial
explaining - in rather juvenile terms (see petr's brief, p.
3 and 4) why the newspaper was beinq so brave.
I will give the editor credit for conceding that:
"Perhaps the decision {to publish the story,
and revealed the name of the iuvenile] was
shaded by the urge to report a story, any story,
as fully as possible." (Underscoring supplied.)
After running the story and the editorial, the
newspaper sought a writ of prohibition against the state's
attorney, and others, to prevent prosecution under the
statute.
The statute seems clearly invalid under our
decisions with respect to prior restraint.

Unless I am

"wide of the target" in this view, no bench memo is
necessary.

L.F.P., Jr.

~o:

Mr . J ;ice Brennan
Kr . J~ice St8wart
Kr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Kr. Justiee Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Kr. Justice Stev~ns

From: The Chief Justice
Circulated:
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-482
Robert K. Smith, Etc., et al.,
Petitioners,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of
v.
West Virginia.
Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
Etc., et al.
[May - , 1979]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to consider whether a West Virginia
statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution by making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of the juvenile
court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.
(1)

The challenged West Virginia statute provides :
~
"[N] or shall the name of any child, in connection with
any proceedings under this chapter be published in any
newspaper without a written order of the court. . . ."
W.Va. Code§ 49- 7-3.
and
"A person who violates ... a provision of this chapter for
which punishment has not been specifically provided,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars, or confined in jail not less than five days nor
more than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment." ld., at 49- 7- 20.

1~
\
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On February 9, 1978, a 15-year-old student was shot and

killed at Hayes Junior High School in St. Albans, W. Va., a
small community located about 13 miles outside of Charleston,
W. Va. The alleged assailant, a 14-year-old classmate, was
identified by seven different eye witnesses and was arrested
by police soon after the incident.
The Charleston Daily Mail and the Charleston Daily Gazette, respondents here, heard about the shooting by monitor~
ing routinely the police band radio frequency; they immediately dispatched reporters and photographers to the Junior
High School. · The reporters for both papers learned the name
of the alleged assailant simply by asking various witnesses, the'
police and an assistant prosecuting attorney who were at the
school.
The staffs of both newspapers prepared articles for publication about the incident. The Daily Mail's first article appeared in its February 9 afternoon edition. The article did
not mention the alleged attacker's name. · ·The editorial decision to omit the name was made · because of the statutory
prohibition against publication, without prior court approval.
The Daily Gazette made a contrary -editorial decision and
published the juvenile's name and picture in an article about
the shooting; it appeareq in the February 10· morning edition
of that paper. In addition, the name of the alleged juvenile
attacker was broadcast over at least three different radio stations on February 9 and 10. Since the information had become public knowledge, the Daily -Mail deeided to include
the juvenile's name in an article in its afternoon paper on
February 10.
On March 1, an indictment against the respondents was
returned by a grand jury; · The indictment alleged that each
knowingly published the name of a youth involved in a
juvenile proceeding in violation of W. Va. Code § 49-7-3.
Respondents then filed an original jurisdiction petition with
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, seeking a writ

'18-482-0PINION
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of prohibition against the prosecuting attorney and the circuit
court judges of Kanawha County, petitioners here. Respondents alleged that the indictment was based on a statute that
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and several provisions of the State's constitution and requested an order prohibiting the county officials from taking any action on the indictment.
The West Virginia Supreme Court issued the writ of prohibition. Relying on holdings of this Court, it held that the
statute abridged the freedom of the press. The court reasoned
that the statute operated as a prior restraint on speech and
that the State's interest in protecting the identity of the juvenile offender did not overcome the heavy presumption against
the constitutionality of such prior restraints.
We granted certiorari. - U . S . - (1978).
(2)
Respondents urge this Court to hold that because §' 49-7-3
requires court approval prior to publication of the juvenile's
name it operates as a "prior restraint" on speech? See Nebra.ska Press Association; v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415
(1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
As such, respondents argue, the statute bears "a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity." Organization
for a Better Austin, supra, at 419. They claim that the State's
interest in the anonymity of a juvenile offender is not sufficient
to overcome that presumption.
Petitioners do not dispute that the statute amounts to a prior
restraint on speech. Rather, they take the view that even if
1

Respondents do not argue that the statute is a prior rei:itraint because
it imposes a rriminal sanction for certain types of publication. At page
11 of their bri<>f they sta.te, "The stM.ut<> in question is, to be sure, not a
prior re:;traint b<•cau:sr it ,;ubjcct.,; newspap<>rs to criminal punishments
for wlmt tlwy print " after tlw event.

78-482-0PINION
SMITH v . DAILY MAIL PUBLISHING CO.

it is a prior restraint the statute is constitutional because of the
significance of the State's interest in protecting the identity of
juveniles.
(3)
The resolution of this case does not turn on whether the statutory grant of authority to the juvenile judge to permit publication of the juvenile's name is, in and of itself, a prior restraint. First Amendment protection reaches beyond prior
restraints, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U. S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S.
469 ( 1975) , and respondents acknowledge that the statutory
provision for court approval of disclosure actually may have a
less offensive effect on freedom of the press than a total ban
on the publication of the child's name.
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a
penal sanction for publishing lawfu1ly obtained, truthful information is not disposition; each action calls for the highest
form of state interest to sustain its validity. The focus in a
prior restraint case differs because the types of state interests
that warrant such restraints have been very narrowly restricted to justifications such as national security or protection
of the Sixth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant. See
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, at 716; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, supra, at 561. See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975).
However, even though the interests that may support a state's
effort to punish publication ha.ve not been so narrowly limited as
to subject, the state must nevertheless show that its punitive
action was necessary to further the interests asserted. Landmark Communications, Inc., supra, at 843.
Our recent decisions demonstrate that state action to punish
the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards. In Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, we declared unconstitutional a Virginia statute
making it a crime to publish information regarding confidential'

78-482-0PINION
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proceedings before a state judicial review commission that
heard complaints as to state court judges' disabilities and
misconduct. In declaring that statute unconstitutional, we
concluded :
"[T]he publication Virginia seeks to punish under its
statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and
the Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the
actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech
and of the press which follow therefrom." I d., at 838.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, we held that
damages could not be recovered against a newspaper for
publishing the name of a rape victim. The suit had been
based on a state statute that made it a crime to publish
the name of the victim; the purpose of the statute was
to protect the privacy right of the individual and the family.
The name of the victim had become known to the public
through official court records dealing with the trial of the
rapist. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Court,
speaking through MR. JusTICE WHITE, reasoned :
"By placing the information in the public domain on
official court records, the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby being
served ... the States may not impose sanctions on the
publication of truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection." I d. , at 495.
One case that involved a true prior restraint is relevant to
our inquiry. In · Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District CCYUrt,
430 U.S. 308 (1976), we struck down a state court injunction
prohibiting the news media from publishing the name or
photograph of an 11-ycar-old boy who was being tried before
a juvenile court. The juvenile judge had permitted reporters
and other members of the public to attend a hearing in the

78-482-0PINION
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case, notwithstanding a state statute closing such trials to the
public. The court then attempted to halt publica.tion of the
information obtained from that hearing. We held that once
the truthful information was "publicly revealed" or "in the
public domain" the court could not constitutionally restrain
its dissemination ..
None of these opinions directly controls this case; however, all suggest strongly that if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance
then state officials may not constitutionally halt or punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest of the highest order. These cases involved
situations where the government itself provided or made possible press access to the information. That factor is not
controlling. Here respondents relied upon routine newspaper
reporting techniques to ascertain the identity of the alleged
assailant. A free press cannot be made to rely upon the willingness of government to provide information on matters of
public significance which the public has a right to know. See
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 11 (1978) (plurality
opinion); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). If
the information is lawfully obtained, as it was here, the state
may not publish its publication except when necessary to
further an interest more substantial than is present here.

(4)
The sole interest advanced by the State to justify its criminal statute is to protect the anonymity of the juvenile offender.
It is asserted that confidentiality will further his rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage further
antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose
future employment or suffer other consequences for this single
offense. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974), similar
arguments were advanced by the State to justify not permitting a criminal defendant to impeach a prosecution wit'

78-482-0PINION
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ness on the basis of his juvenile record. We said there that
" [ w] e do not and need not challenge the State's interest as a
matter of policy in the administration of criminal justice to
seek to preserve the anonymity of. a juvenile offender." Id.,
at 319. However, we concluded that the State's policy must
be subordinated to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation. Ibid. The values embodied in the First
Amendment are generally equal in importance to those rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 561. The reasoning of
Davis that the constitutional right must prevail over the
state's interest in protecting juveniles applies with equal force
here.
The magnitude of the State's interest in this statute is not
sufficient to overcome the presumptive invalidity of a restraint or to justify application of a criminal penalty to respondents. Moreover, the statute's approach does not satisfy
constitutional requirements. The statute does not restrict
the electronic media or any form of publication, except "newspapers," from printing ~he names of youths charged in a
juvenile proceeding. In this very case, three radio stations
announced the a.lleged assailant's name before the Daily Mail
decided to publish it. · Thus, even assuming the statute served
a state interest of the highest order, the means of accomplishing that purpose are insufficient.
In addition, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the
imposition of criminal penalties is necessary to protect the
confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. As Respondents Brief
points out at page 29 n. **, all 50 states have statutes that
provide in some way for confidentiality, but only five, including West Virginia/ impose criminal penalties on nonparties
for publication of the identity of the juvenile. Although
every state has asserted a similar interest, all but a handful
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-107 (6); Ga. Code § 24A-:-3503 (g) (1); N. H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:27-28 ; S. C. Olde § 14-21-30.
2
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have found other ways of accomplishing the objective. See
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 843. 3
(5)

Our holding in this case is narrow. There is no issue
before us of unlawful press access to confiqential judical proceedings, see Cox Broadcasting, supra, at 496 n. 26; there is
no issue here of privacy or pretrial prejudipe. At issue is
simply the power of a state to punish the truthful publication
of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by
the newpaper. 4 The asserted state interest cannot justify the
statute's imposition of criminal sanctions on this type of publication. Accordingly, the judgment of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the considera.tion or
decision of this case.

a The approach advocated by the National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges is based on cooperation between juvenile court personnel and newspaper editors. It is suggested that if the courts make clear their purpose
and methods then the press will exercise discretion and generally decline
to publish the juvenile's name without some prior copsultatjon with the
juvenile court judge. See Riederer, Secrecy or Privacy; Communication
Problems in the Juvenile Court Field, 17 J. Mo. Bar 66, 69-70 (1961);
Conway, Publicizing the Juvenile Court: A Public Responsibility, 16 Juv.
Ct. Judges J. 21-22 (1965).
4
In light of our disposition of the First and Fourteenth Amendment
issue, we need not reach respondents' claim that the statute, by being
applicable only to newspapers but not other forms of journalistjc expression, violates equal protection.
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